Last edited by Moogulkis
Thursday, July 23, 2020 | History

4 edition of Tractability in incentive contracting found in the catalog.

Tractability in incentive contracting

Alex Edmans

Tractability in incentive contracting

by Alex Edmans

  • 196 Want to read
  • 29 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English


Edition Notes

StatementAlex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 15545., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15545.
ContributionsGabaix, Xavier., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsHB1
The Physical Object
FormatElectronic resource
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL23969255M
LC Control Number2009656095

  An Incentive Contracts (Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart ) is appropriate when a Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract is not appropriate and the required supplies or services can be acquired at lower costs and relating the amount of profit or fee payable under the contract to the contractor’s ive contracts are designed to obtain specific . This Book was ranked at 6 by Google Books for keyword Economie. Book ID of Incentives in Procurement Contracting's Books is rp_fAAAAMAAJ, Book which was written byJim Leitzelhave ETAG "dwjPyetxmkU" Book which was published by since .

  Other incentive contracts may be tied to schedule rather than cost. The contract specifies a completion date which must be met in order for the contractor to receive his full fee, or profit. Positive incentives can be built in which increase the fee for early completion. Conversely, negative incentives can also be included which reduce the fee. Private information induced incentive constraints can cause allocations to diverge from full information optimal allocations, often in the direction of limited insurance, but can bring unanticipated anomalies. Related, plausible contract exclusion restrictions can be damaging in welfare terms.

Subjective bonuses can reflect implicit contracts entered at the beginning of the period when certain employees commit to more difficult targets and managers use subjective bonuses at the end of the period to reward this commitment. We examine this prediction in a budget-based incentive systems’ setting. In an outcomes-based contract, the contractor is incented to achieve the program’s outcomes in a timely and efficient manner, as this leads to earning contract incentives. When those contracts are up for re-bid, the incumbent contractor will be incented to pass on cost reductions to the government to help ensure they continue with the work.


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Tractability in incentive contracting by Alex Edmans Download PDF EPUB FB2

Tractability in Incentive Contracting a given action function to be implementable. The contract now depends on messages sent by the agent regarding the noise, but remains tractable. The above analysis focuses on the implementation of a given action func-tion. Jointly deriving the optimal action in addition to the efficient contract that.

Tractability in Incentive Contracting Alex Edmans. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and NBER. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic.

Remark 2 states that the contract's incentive compatibility is robust to the timing assumption. In particular, if noise follows the action in each period, the contract in Theorem Cited by: Tractability in Incentive Contracting Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix.

NBER Working Paper No. Issued in November NBER Program(s):Asset Pricing, Corporate Finance, Economic Fluctuations and Growth, Labor Studies This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form).Cited by: Downloadable (with restrictions).

This article develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e., closed-form) optimal contracts, with few restrictions on the utility function, cost of effort, or noise distribution. By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide correct incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average.

Tractability in Incentive Contracting. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP Number of pages: 69 Posted: 11 Jan Downloads 3. Date Written: Ap Abstract. This paper develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e. closed-form) optimal contracts, with few restrictions on the utility function, cost of effort or noise distribution Cited by: Tractability in Incentive Contracting.

the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the. This article develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e., closed-form) optimal contracts, with few restrictions on the utility function, cost of effort, or noise distribution.

By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide correct incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This tightly constrains the set of admissible contracts. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," Working PapersUniversity of. Tractability in Incentive Contracting ∗ Alex Edmans Wharton Xavier Gabaix NYU Stern, CEPR and NBER September 8, Abstract This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems where the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form).

By. CONTRACT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES J Fred Schlich [email protected] +1 Tractability in incentive contracting. By Alex Edmans and Xavier Gabaix.

Abstract. This article develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e., closed-form) optimal con-tracts, with few restrictions on the utility function, cost of effort, or noise distribution.

By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract. CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems where the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form).

By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide correct incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average.

Tractability and Detail-Neutrality in Incentive Contracting. Tractability and Detail-Neutrality in Incentive Contracting. Article (PDF Available) February Get this from a library.

Tractability in incentive contracting. [Alex Edmans; Xavier Gabaix; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- "This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force.

Tractability in Incentive Contracting Abstract This article develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e., closed-form) optimal contracts, with few restrictions on the utility function, cost of effort, or noise distribution. By modeling the noise before the. Tractability in Incentive Contracting Alex Edmans and Xavier Gabaix NBER Working Paper No.

November JEL No. D2,G34,J3 ABSTRACT This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract.

Contract incentives exist to encourage the completion of a contract. A financial reward is generally used as a contract incentive, although other types of rewards can be used. Incentive Contract Facts. The purpose of incentive contracts is to tie a financial reward to the completion of an objective.

Incentive contracting typically involves a. Abstract: Brief, non-technical summary of the framework for achieving tractable incentive contracts developed in "Tractability in Incentive Contracting" and used in "The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market and Dynamic CEO Compensation.".

Tractability in incentive contracting; Save to my profile Tractability in incentive contracting. Journal. Review of Financial Studies.

Subject. Finance. Publishing details. Review of Financial Studies September Vol p Authors / Editors. Edmans A; Gabaix X. Biographies. Edmans A. Another advantage of tractability is it allows the model to be easily extended to accommodate other important features of real-life contracting situations.

Two examples are below. A Market Equilibrium Edmans and Gabaix (b) show that the contract can be embedded into a market equilibrium with multiple principals and agents.

Tractability in Incentive Contracting Tractability in Incentive Contracting Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier Alex Edmans Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and NBER Xavier Gabaix NYU Stern School of Business, CEPR and NBER This article develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e., closed-form) optimal con- tracts, with few restrictions on the utility function.The incentive contract deals with the variations from predicted costs.

Moreover, the establishment of a target cost in an incentive contract is a result of several variable factors, including: (1) the Government’s price objective; (2) the contractor’s price objective; and (3) negotiation as a tool of contract pricing.